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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. To determine whether a defendant has standing to challenge a rental vehicle search, does the
court consider the totality of the circumstances?
II. Did the defendant have standing to challenge the reasonableness of the government’s actions?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are
reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on November 12, 2008. R. 25. Petitioner filed his
petition for writ of certiorari on December 14, 2008. R. 26. This Court granted the petition on
March 7, 2009. R. 27. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2000).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
Petitioner, Tim Riggins, and his wife, Lyla Riggins, found themselves in need of a rental
car when their own car broke down. R. 5. The Rigginses shared their car since Lyla did not work
and was a stay-at-home mother. R. 5. At Tim’s request, Lyla rented a Chevy Malibu. R.5, 19. To
pay for the rental, Lyla used a credit card issued in her name from the Rigginses’ joint account;
Tim was the primary card holder of the account and paid the credit card bills. R. 5. When she
completed the rental agreement, Lyla did not list Tim as an additional authorized driver, even
though she knew he would be driving the car. R. 5. At the time it did not occur to her that she
needed to do so. R. 5. Both Tim and Lyla drove the Malibu during the two weeks they rented it,
but Tim drove it more often than Lyla. R. 5. Lyla knew when Tim used the rental car and he did
so with her permission. R. 5. Tim kept the keys to the Malibu’s ignition and glove compartment
on his key ring. R. 4.
During the afternoon of July 3, 2008, Tim drove the Malibu to visit a friend. R. 7. Shortly
after leaving his friend’s house, Tim was pulled over for speeding by Officer Womack of the
Dillon County Police Department. R. 3, 7. Tim provided Officer Womack with his valid driver’s
license and the rental agreement for the Malibu. R. 3-4. Upon seeing that Tim was not listed as
an authorized driver on the rental contract, Officer Womack asked Tim if he could search the car.
R. 3-4. Tim declined to give his consent to a search because he was in a hurry. R. 4. Based on
Tim’s status as an unauthorized driver of the rental car, Officer Womack believed he did not
need consent or probable cause to search the car. R. 4, 20. Accordingly, he asked Tim to step out
of the Malibu and proceeded to search the car. R. 4. During the search, Officer Womack found a
quantity of drugs in the glove compartment, as well as Tim’s personal effects throughout the car;
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these included an iPod, a gym bag containing men’s clothing, a business suit, and tennis shoes.
R. 4, 20. After completing his search of the Malibu, Officer Womack placed Tim under arrest. R.
20.
B. Course of Proceedings
Tim Riggins was indicted by a grand jury for possession with intent to manufacture,
distribute, and dispense 500 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).R. 2. While his
case was pending in the United States District Court, Riggins filed a motion to suppress the
evidence obtained during the search of the rented Malibu by Officer Womack. R. 7. After the
court denied the motion, Riggins entered a conditional plea of guilty and appealed the denial of
his motion to suppress. R. 23, 25. The Fifteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s
order. R. 25. Riggins now appeals to this Court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
In determining standing to challenge a rental vehicle search, the Court should consider
the totality of the circumstances. Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,
and it is measured objectively by looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding a
particular case. Standing to challenge a search on Fourth Amendment grounds arises when a
person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. To be legitimate, the
expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Because legitimacy
hinges on reasonableness, the Court must look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.
Bright-line rules do not fairly measure reasonableness. For that reason, the Court has
consistently applied a totality of the circumstances analysis in all its Fourth Amendment cases.
Because the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment are so important, efficiency and
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ease of application do not justify the use of bright-line rules. Further, the Court has held that no
one factor may determine standing. The Fifteenth Circuit’s bright-line rule misinterprets this
Court’s holding in Rakas, not only because it bases standing on one factor, but also because that
factor is a property interest in the area search. The Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places and, therefore, a property interest is not required to have standing to challenge a search.
Accordingly, the Fifteenth Circuit Court’s bright-line rule is contrary not only to this Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but to the Fourth Amendment itself.
II.
Tim Riggins had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental car and, therefore, has
standing to challenge the search. While not controlling, a property interest is a factor to be
considered in determining standing. At the time of the search, Tim Riggins was in lawful
possession and control of the rental car because he had permission from the renter, his wife, to
use it. While his unauthorized use of the rental car was a breach of the rental agreement, it was
not unlawful.
Society would recognize Tim Riggins’ expectation of privacy in the rental car as
reasonable. Tim Riggins’ use of the rental car arose out of his marriage and family life. The
Rigginses rented the car because their personal car was not running. Accordingly, he used the car
as he would have used their own. Tim requested that his wife rent the car and the rental was paid
for using their joint credit card account. Tim’s wife, Lyla rented the car with the intention that
Tim would be driving it and she gave him permission to do so. She did not list Tim on the rental
agreement because she did not think it was necessary to do so. The circumstances surrounding
Tim Riggins’ use of the rental car gave him an expectation of privacy while he drove it. Based
on these circumstances, society would recognize Tim Riggins’ expectation of privacy as
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reasonable. Therefore, Tim Riggins had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental car and
has standing to challenge the search.
ARGUMENT
I. IN DETERMINING STANDING TO CHALLENGE A RENTAL VEHICLE SEARCH,
THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN
ORDER TO FAIRLY BALANCE PRIVACY RIGHTS AGAINST PUBLIC SAFETY
NEEDS, THEREBY CONFORMING TO THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT.
A. Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.
Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.
33, 39 (1996). Reasonableness is measured objectively by looking at the totality of the
circumstances, not by bright-line rules. Id.; Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 125 (2006);
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984). Standing to challenge a search on Fourth
Amendment grounds arises when a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
searched. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990). To be legitimate, his expectation of
privacy cannot be merely subjective; it must be one society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Id.; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.128, 143, n. 12. (1978). Because standing for Fourth
Amendment protection hinges on the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy, the
court must look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding that expectation to determine if it
is reasonable. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39.
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures by the
government. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The exclusion of evidence
obtained by the government in violation of the Fourth Amendment is a means for effecting that
protection. Id. Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature and may not be asserted
vicariously through the rights of others. Rakas, 439 U.S. at133. However, a person may have a
4

legitimate expectation of privacy in a place that is not his own, as the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places. Id. at 143; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The
Court has described the Fourth Amendment as providing sanctuary wherever a person may have
a legitimate expectation of privacy. Olson, 495 U.S. at 97, n. 5. Because an expectation of
privacy can arise in a vast number of places and under any number of circumstances, the Court
should favor a broad analysis that is faithful to the Fourth Amendment. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 155156 (Powell, J., concurring). An expectation of privacy is legitimate when it is reasonable.
Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39. In its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has emphasized that
reasonableness is measured by examining the totality of the circumstances. Id.; Randolph, 547
U.S. at 125. Reasonableness is determined by the particular facts of a case. United States v.
Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003). Because each case involves different facts, the soundest results
are produced using a totality of the circumstances analysis, which does not give “short shrift” to
important details or inflate “marginal” ones. Id.
In its opinion below, the Fifteenth Circuit incorrectly presumed that this Court did not
envision a totality of the circumstances approach for determining standing. R. 21, 25. In fact, the
Court has held that it must examine all the facts and circumstances in all Fourth Amendment
cases. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976). Further, the standing inquiry has
been described as whether a person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable in light of all the
surrounding circumstances. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152 (Powell, J. concurring). The Court has noted
that there is no clear dividing line for reasonableness, but rather there is a point where one shade
of gray is separated from another. Id. at 146. It has also pointed out that Fourth Amendment
cases involve drawing fine lines that are not amenable to bright line rules. Id. at 147. Because no
single factor can determine standing, a totality of the circumstances approach is more in line with
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the Court’s intention and its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence than a bright-line rule would be.
Id. at 152-53 (Powell, J., concurring); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177-78; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375.
B. Efficiency and ease of application do not justify a bright-line rule that disregards the
Fourth Amendment.
The Fifteenth Circuit has adopted a bright-line rule that denies the unauthorized driver of
a rental vehicle challenge a search. R. 21, 25. In doing so, it reasoned that such a rule is bestsuited for determining standing because it is thoroughly workable, easily administered, and
provides for a clearer application of Fourth Amendment principles. R. 21, 25. However, as
discussed above, standing arises when a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and
reasonableness cannot be appropriately measured using bright-line rules. Robinette, 519 U.S. at
39; Randolph, 547 U.S. at 125; Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177; Olson, 495 U.S. at 95. Further, brightline rules serve neither Fourth Amendment protections, nor the criminal justice system; instead
they are merely “facile solutions”. Rakas, 439 U.S.at 156 (Powell, J., concurring).
The Court has held that making law enforcement more efficient is not a justification for
disregarding the Fourth Amendment. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1723 (2009) (citing
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)). In Gant, the Court found its own bright-line rule
allowing vehicle searches incident to any arrest unconstitutional, finding it served no purpose
except to provide the police with an entitlement to make a warrantless search. Id. at 1721. It also
criticized the state for undervaluing the privacy interests at stake. Id. at 1720. While it recognized
that a person has less of an expectation of privacy in a vehicle than a home, the court held that
the expectation is important and deserving of constitutional protection. Id. at 1720. Accordingly,
the entitlement created by the bright-line rule was deemed an “anathema” to the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 1721. The Fifteenth Circuit’s bright-line rule denying standing to
unauthorized drivers of rental vehicles has the effect of entitling the police to search a vehicle
6

merely because the driver is not listed on the rental contract. R. 22, 25. That is precisely what
occurred in the instant case: because Riggins was not listed as an authorized driver on the rental
agreement, Officer Womack believed he could search the rented Malibu without consent or
probable cause. R. 3-4, R. 20. In fact, Officer Womack initially decided to search the car because
Riggins was not listed as an authorized driver. R. 3-4. If a rule that allows a search of a vehicle
incident to an arrest of its occupant does not comport with the Fourth Amendment, then a rule
that allows a search of a rental vehicle merely because the driver is not authorized per the rental
agreement surely does not either.
C. By basing standing on the sole factor of an ownership or possessory interest in the
vehicle, the Fifteenth Circuit’s bright-line rule misinterprets Rakas and disregards the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The Fifteenth Circuit has misinterpreted Rakas by holding that an ownership or
possessory interest in a vehicle is required for standing. R. 21, 25. It holds that an unauthorized
driver is not in lawful possession or control of the rental vehicle and, therefore, cannot have
standing. R. 21, 25. First, no single factor can determine standing. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152-53
(Powell, J., concurring); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177-78. Yet, the Fifteenth Circuit’s bright-line rule
does just that; it determines standing based only on the existence of a property interest in the
vehicle. R. 21, 25. More importantly, the Court in Rakas expressly held that legitimate
expectations of privacy need not be based on a common-law interest in real or personal property
or on the invasion of such an interest. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, n. 12. Further, the Court took
“great pains” to stress that “arcane distinctions” between guests, licensees, invitees and others
found in property and tort law are not controlling factors for determining standing. Id. at 143,
149, n. 17. In denying standing to the petitioners in Rakas, the Court focused on their lack of a
possessory interest only because they had argued they were legitimately on the premises as
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passengers in the vehicle that was searched; they did not assert that they had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Id. at 149, n. 17. However, the Court held that because a
property interest is a factor to be considered, lawful possession and control of property will
usually give rise to standing. Id. at 143, n. 12.
More recently, the Court has held that the test for determining the legitimacy of a
person’s expectation of privacy is whether society is prepared to recognize the expectation as
reasonable; it made no reference to a property interest. Olson, 495 U.S. at 92. In holding that it
was reasonable for an overnight guest to have an expectation of privacy in the host’s home, the
Court noted that the guest was there with permission from the host, and that the power of the
guest to admit or exclude was not essential to receive Fourth Amendment protection. Id. at 99100. In its analysis, the Court did not address whether the host owned or rented his home, and if
he did rent, whether the lease had a no guest clause. Id. at 94-100. This is consistent with the
Court’s prior holding that standing is not based on property interests and that the “arcane
distinctions” found in property and tort law are not controlling factors. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, n.
12, 149, n. 17.
II. TIM RIGGINS HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE
RENTAL CAR AND, THEREFORE, HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
REASONABLENESS OF THE SEARCH.
In order to have standing to challenge a search on Fourth Amendment grounds, Tim
Riggins must show that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental car when it was
searched. Olson, 495 U.S. at 95. He had a subjective expectation of privacy in the rental car, as
evidenced by his refusal to consent to the search. R. 3-4. However, he must also show that
society will recognize his subjective expectation as reasonable. Id.; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at
143, n. 12. No one factor can determine the reasonableness of Tim Riggins’ expectation. Rakas,
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439 U.S. at 152-53 (Powell, J., concurring); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177-78. Accordingly, the Court
must examine all the facts and circumstances surrounding Tim Riggins’ expectation of privacy in
the rental car. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375; Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39.
A. Tim Riggins was in lawful possession and control of the rental car at the time of the
search.
Because the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, a person may have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in a place that is not his own. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143; Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). It provides sanctuary wherever a person may have a
legitimate expectation of privacy. Olson, 495 U.S. at 97, n. 5 (emphasis added). Accordingly, a
legitimate expectation of privacy does not need to be based on a property interest in the area
searched. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, n. 12. However, it is a factor that may be considered in
determining standing. Id.
When a property interest is a factor considered, lawful possession and control of property
will usually give rise to standing. Id. In the context of a vehicle, exclusive control of it may be
sufficient. Id. at 155-56 (Powell, J., concurring). A showing of an absolute power to admit or
exclude is not required to gain Fourth Amendment protection. Olson, 495 U.S. at 99-100. As the
driver, Riggins was in lawful possession of the rental car at the time of the search. He had
permission from the authorized driver to use the car. R. 5. He also possessed the rental
agreement. R. 19. He was in possession of the keys to the car, which gave him exclusive control
of it at the time of the search. R. 4. Further, he had a valid driver’s license and, therefore, was not
operating the car unlawfully. R. 19.
The Fifteenth Circuit held that permission from the renter does not create a legitimate
expectation of privacy. R. 21, 25. Because it considers the rental agreement to be controlling, the
renter does not have authority to give anyone else permission to drive the rental car. R. 21, 25.
9

However, this Court has stressed that “arcane distinctions” between guests, licensees, invitees
and others found in property and tort law are not controlling factors for determining standing.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 149, n. 17. Despite this, the Fifteenth Circuit’s reliance on the terms of
the rental agreement to define the status of the driver makes such a distinction. Further, its
emphasis on this point is misguided since a property interest alone does not determine standing.
Id. at 143, n. 12. It merely makes the Fifteenth Circuit’s bright-line rule brighter by giving “short
shrift” to important details while inflating “marginal” ones. Banks, 540 U.S. at 36. Further, Tim
Riggins’ unauthorized use of the rental car was not unlawful, but rather a breach of the rental
agreement. See United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1998 (9th Cir. 2006); See also United
States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 646-47 (9th Cir. 2000)(granting standing to a car renter even
though the rental contract had expired); United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1402 (11th Cir.
1998) (granting standing to a car renter even though the rental contract had expired). Therefore,
while Tim Riggins’ unauthorized use of the rental car may have violated the rental agreement, he
was still in lawful possession and control of it at the time of the search.
B. It is reasonable for Riggins to have an expectation of privacy in the rental car because he
had permission from the renter to use it.
Tim Riggins’ subjective expectation of privacy in the rental car was reasonable because
he had permission from the renter, his wife, to drive it and he had been given possession of the
car’s keys. R. 4-5. Further, his wife rented the car with the intention that he would be driving it.
R. 5. While the Fifteenth Circuit refuses to recognize permission from the renter to be valid,
other circuit courts have deemed the unauthorized driver’s expectation of privacy reasonable
when he has permission from the renter. United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1999 (reasoning
that permission from the renter gives the unauthorized driver joint authority over the car); United
States v. Muhammad, 58 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that the unauthorized driver is
10

in lawful possession of the car when he has permission from the renter). See also United States v.
Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001)(holding that Smith had standing based on the
surrounding circumstances, including permission from the renter, who was also his wife).
Prior to adopting the bright-line rule followed by the Fifteenth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit
recognized that permission from the renter would give the unauthorized driver standing to
challenge a search. United States v. Kye Soo Lee, 898 F.2d 1034, 1038 (5th Cir. 1990)(overruled
by United States v. Seeley, 331 F.3d 471, 472 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2003)). The Fifth Circuit recognized
that, per Rakas, standing hinges on a legitimate expectation of privacy, not on a property right in
the area searched. Lee, 898 F.2d at 1038. It granted standing to the unauthorized driver of a
rental truck because he had received permission and the keys to the vehicle from the renter,
thereby being entrusted with the truck. Id. The court recognized that a property interest is a factor
to be considered in determining standing, but that other factors must also be considered. Id.
Accordingly, if federal circuit courts have found that an unauthorized driver who has permission
from the renter of the vehicle has a reasonable expectation of privacy, it follows that society will
consider it reasonable as well. Olson, 495 U.S.at 95; Rakas, 439 U.S.at 143, n. 12.
C. Tim Riggins’ expectation of privacy is reasonable based on personal and societal values
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
A person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a place that is not his own
because the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143; Katz, 389
U.S. at 351. Wherever a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy, the Fourth Amendment
will provide sanctuary. Olson, 495 U.S. at 97, n. 5. A legitimate expectation of privacy is one
that society will recognize as reasonable. Id. at 95; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.128, 143, n. 12.
(1978). It is an everyday expectation shared by us all. Olson, 495 U.S. at 98. The test for
legitimacy is whether the search violates personal and societal values which are protected by the
11

Fourth Amendment. Oliver, at 181-83. The Court has held that a person should expect as much
privacy in places other than his own as he would in a public phone booth. Olson, 495 U.S. at 99
(referring to the holding in Katz that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a
public phone booth.).
In Olson, the Court held that the defendant, who was wanted in connection with an armed
robbery and murder, had standing in the home in which he was staying as an overnight guest.
495 U.S. at 93-98. The Court held that his status as an overnight guest gave him an expectation
of privacy in the house that society could find reasonable as an everyday expectation shared by
everyone. Id. at 98-99. Based on Judge Harlan’s concurring opinion in Rakas, the Tenth Circuit
recognized that a motel guest who remains past the scheduled check-out time had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the room. United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 149-150 (10th Cir.
1986). Similarly, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have recognized that the renter of a car has a
reasonable expectation of privacy even if the rental period had expired because he retained
sufficient control and possession over the car. Henderson, 241 F.3d at 647; Cooper, 133 F.3d at
1402. Because courts have recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy for individuals in
situations such as those in Katz, Olson, Owens, Henderson, and Cooper, Tim Riggins’
expectation of privacy in the rental car should be recognized as reasonable as well. It is
reasonable for a person to believe he has an expectation of privacy in rental car that is being
shared with one’s spouse while their personal car is not working.
Another factor used by the Court in determining if a person has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in a place that is not his own is how he uses the area, such as if he stays in there
overnight or keeps his belongings there. Oliver, at 178. Rakas, at 153 (Harlan, J. concurring).
Tim Riggins used the rental car as a replacement while the Rigginses’ personal car was not
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running. R. 5. He drove the car often during the rental period and kept personal belongings in it,
including a business suit and workout clothes. R.5, 20. At the time of the stop, he had used the
car to visit a friend. R. 7. He kept the keys to the car on his key ring. R. 4. Tim Riggins was
using the rental car as he would his personal car and, thus, had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in it as he would if he was driving his own car.
Additionally, Tim Riggins had an expectation of privacy in the rental car because in a
sense he was the de facto renter of the car. In Smith, the Sixth Circuit Court held that the
unauthorized driver of a rental car had standing based on several factors: he had permission from
the renter, his wife, to drive the car; although his wife completed the rental agreement, he made
the reservation; and the rental was paid for using a credit card issued in his name (joint
account?). Smith, 263 F.3d at 86-87. The court determined that under the circumstances, Smith
could be considered the de facto renter. Id. Further, it deemed his relationships with the rental
company and his wife as those recognized by law and society upon which standing could be
based. Id. While not identical, Tim Riggins’ situation is similar to that of the driver in Smith.
Tim Riggins’ credit card account was used to pay for the car rental and his wife was the renter.
R. 5. He directed his wife to rent the car in order for them to both use it while their personal car
was not working. R.5. He drove the car often during the rental period and kept personal
belongings in it. R.5, 20. Based on his use of the car, his relationship with his wife, and his
connection to the rental company Tim Riggins’ expectation of privacy in the car would be
considered reasonable. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, n. 12.
Finally, Tim Riggins’ use of the rental car arose out of his marriage and family life. R. 5.
When the Rigginses’ personal car broke down, Tim asked his wife, Lyla, to obtain a rental
vehicle. R.5. She rented the car using a credit card in her name that was issued from their joint
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account; Tim Riggins is the primary card holder on the account. R. 5. He is also the sole
breadwinner of the family and pays the credit card bills. R. 5. Because they shared their personal
car, the rental car was to be used by both Lyla and Riggins. R. 5. In fact, during the time the
Rigginses had the rental car, Tim drove it more often than Lyla. R. 5. Lyla did not include Tim
as an authorized driver on the rental agreement because she did not think it was necessary, even
though she knew he would be driving it. R. 5. Marriage is a fundamental right. Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 347, 383-84 (1978). It is a union so intimate as to be called “sacred”. Id.
(quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). As husband and wife, the Rigginses
acted as one, sharing income, a car, and a credit card. R. 5. Likewise, as husband and wife, they
rented and shared the car Tim was driving at the time of the search. R. 5. Because his use of the
rental car is so connected to his marriage and family life, society would recognize he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car at the time of the search. Rakas, 439 U.S. at
143, n. 12.
CONCLUSION

Tim Riggins had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental car and, therefore, has
standing to challenge the search. While not controlling, a property interest is a factor to be
considered in determining standing. At the time of the search, Tim Riggins was in lawful
possession and control of the rental car because he had permission from the renter, his wife, to
use it. While his unauthorized use of the rental car was a breach of the rental agreement, it was
not unlawful.
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Society would recognize Tim Riggins’ expectation of privacy in the rental car as
reasonable. Tim Riggins’ use of the rental car arose out of his marriage and family life. The
Rigginses rented the car because their personal car was not running. Accordingly, he used the car
as he would have used their own. Tim requested that his wife rent the car and the rental was paid
for using their joint credit card account. Tim’s wife, Lyla rented the car with the intention that
Tim would be driving it and she gave him permission to do so. She did not list Tim on the rental
agreement because she did not think it was necessary to do so. The circumstances surrounding
Tim Riggins’ use of the rental car gave him an expectation of privacy while he drove it. Based
on these circumstances, society would recognize Tim Riggins’ expectation of privacy as
reasonable. Therefore, Tim Riggins had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental car and
has standing to challenge the search.

PRAYER
For these reasons, Petitioner prays the Court overturn the decision of the court below.
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